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Because railway operation has been primarily a domestic matter, each country has developed its own procedures for railway safety regulation, and for investigating and recording railway accidents. There has been less international co-operation in rail safety than in other modes: aviation and maritime transport are more international by their nature, and road safety is recognised to be a common issue in all countries. One consequence is a lack of reliable and comparable international information on rail safety: that in turn makes it difficult to quantify the key railway safety problems at a European level, and difficult for the different states to learn from the successes and failures of each other. This briefing has been compiled by the members of ETSC's rail safety working party sharing their knowledge of the key rail safety issues in their own countries; we also present data on rail casualties assembled by the Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC). Our discussions have demonstrated that there is much in common between the rail safety problems in different countries, which are evident in the issues discussed in the briefing. We have also discovered some apparent differences, and there are certainly differences in the safety policies of the different railways. However, we have not been able to explore and learn as much from the differences as we would like. That remains for the future. Following this introduction, the briefing continues as follows. Section 2 considers the available data on railway casualties and accidents at the European level, presenting the casualty data assembled by the UIC, and noting the large gaps in the data that are available for Europe. Section 3 considers the implications for safety of the trend evident throughout Europe of breaking up the large vertically-integrated public railway operators into a number of smaller more specialist, and sometimes privatised, companies. Section 4 identifies key railway safety issues common to many European countries. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Railway safety data Table 1 presents the UIC data on railway fatalities for the period 1970 to 1996 for the fifteen member states of the EU. Figure 1 shows the trends in the numbers of fatalities, subdivided into passengers, railway staff, and third parties, who are people not actually travelling or working on the railway. Figure 2 shows the trend in passenger fatalities per billion passenger-kilometres.
Fatalities by type of person Passenger- Passenger kilometres Fatalities Pass- Staff Third All (billion) per billion engers parties pass-km 1970 376 346 1,248 1,970 191.428 1.96 1971 387 357 1,365 2,109 193.583 2.00 1972 433 302 936 1,671 184.698 2.34 1973 302 263 1,058 1,623 184.841 1.63 1974 299 175 864 1,338 192.970 1.55 1975 268 152 857 1,277 191.869 1.40 1976 276 184 723 1,183 192.994 1.43 1977 211 168 868 1,247 193.949 1.09 1978 257 167 912 1,336 199.831 1.29 1979 228 149 881 1,258 204.660 1.11 1980 313 142 963 1,418 225.456 1.39 1981 214 129 913 1,256 214.287 1.00 1982 246 120 891 1,257 209.176 1.18 1983 203 105 770 1,078 207.868 0.97 1984 195 70 767 1,032 228.089 0.85 1985 290 110 783 1,183 234.125 1.24 1986 152 73 748 973 232.934 0.65 1987 162 97 691 950 235.175 0.69 1988 268 82 746 1,096 244.595 1.10 1989 195 101 672 968 246.168 0.79 1990 162 79 711 952 251.011 0.65 1991 171 72 774 1,017 255.059 0.67 1992 140 46 748 934 259.262 0.54 1993 114 60 971 1,145 236.599 0.48 1994 100 39 931 1,070 245.256 0.41 1995 98 34 756 888 257.781 0.38 1996 84 48 710 842 264.379 0.32 1970-96 6,144 3,670 23,257 33,071 5,978.043 1.03Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC) Figure 1: Railway fatalities: EU Countries: 1970-1996 (UIC) 
Figure 2: Railway passenger fatalities per billion passenger-km 1970-1996 (UIC) 
2.2 Problems in the UIC data
2.3 Improving European railway accident data The purpose of having clear definitions is not to try and impose them on all states, but to provide a standard for European-level data, and a basis for adjusting data collected on differing definitions. Inventory of current data. Although both UIC and Eurostat collect some data on railway casualties, there appears to be no collective knowledge of what data are collected in the different member states, and on what definitions. For example, in some states rail accident data are assembled for all railways in the state by a single railway safety inspectorate, whereas in others there is no single inspectorate, and therefore no mechanism by which, for example, data for metros are combined with data for the national system. It is therefore important to know what is covered by existing data collection systems, and where the gaps are. Accidents. The data assembled by UIC and Eurostat are of casualties rather than accidents. However, accidents are also important, especially accidents to trains that can lead to many fatalities. Data on train accidents are collected within member states by railway operators or accident investigating bodies, often in great detail. However, there is no mechanism by which such data are assembled at the European level. It is only with such data that analysis of the frequencies of train accidents can be carried out, and the occasional serious accident, such as the recent tragic derailment at Eschede, can be placed in context. Again, definitions are required of precisely what accidents would be counted, and how they are to be classified. Fatalities or all casualties? Accidents cause both fatalities and injuries. However, ETSC believes that it is best to concentrate on fatalities and fatal accidents in the first instance, because these raise fewer problems of definition and data reliability.
The general approach when separating railway activities has been to allocate general responsibility for the safe operation of railways to the track authorities, or 'infrastructure controllers' as they are known in the UK. The infrastructure controllers must not only ensure that their own track and signalling systems are safe, but are also often required to check the safety competence of any train operator who wishes to use their systems. The infrastructure controllers are in turn responsible to the government or railway inspectorate for carrying out these functions. Railway fragmentation requires more formal safety processes than in the past. The most important formal process is the production by every railway operator of a general document reviewing all their responsibilities for safety. Such documents are labelled 'safety cases'. The aims of such documents are:
There are also many other ways in which rail fragmentation requires more formality in safety management. For example, with a single national operator driver training and certification of competence could be carried out internally. That is no longer possible, because staff may move from one company to another, and they now require formal documents which prove their competence both to their new employer, and to the infrastructure controller. Privatisation of railways also sometimes creates a fear that operators will take greater risks than public operators in order to enhance their profits, and 'put commercial considerations ahead of safety'. Given the limited extent of rail privatisation so far in Europe, there is little evidence one way or the other whether this fear is justified. Moreover, the argument can also go the other way, because a good safety reputation is a commercial asset. Some countries now have independent railway accident investigation bodies, whereas others do not. Not all the new railway operators will be in a position to carry out high-quality accident investigation, so independent bodies will be more needed in future. ETSC recommends that the EU takes steps to ensure that all railway accidents are investigated by independent bodies.
4 Other priority issues in rail safety
4.1 Train protection Train accidents have a wide variety of causes, including vehicle or track defects, defects in the signalling systems, and errors by operating staff. Accidents due to errors by signalling staff in normal operation have now become rare, because modern signalling systems have automatic protection against such errors. However, accidents due to errors by drivers, such as passing signals at danger are more common, because it has been more difficult to develop automatic protection against these. Such errors are never deliberate, and they are very infrequent for each individual driver, but for systems as a whole they are a persistent problem. With the development of modern processors, it has become possible to protect against drivers' errors; the generic label for systems to do this is Automatic Train Protection (ATP). ATP systems continually calculate the maximum safe speed of a train in the light of current track and signal conditions, compare the actual speed with the maximum, and apply the brakes automatically if the train is going too fast. However, the main problem about current ATP systems is that, if they are installed as an overlay on the existing trains and signalling systems, they have high costs in relation to the relatively small number of casualties they save. Therefore different countries have different policies towards ATP. Many countries have installed it (Sweden, the Netherlands); some are in the process of installing it (Italy), and some have decided against it, except in special circumstances (Britain). It is less costly to install ATP on new trains and lines than on existing ones: most of Europe's new-built high speed lines have it, as does the Channel Tunnel. In the longer term, new train control systems can have ATP built-in at no extra cost. ETSC recommends this. It is desirable to make new systems interoperable. It is desirable that new systems are independently assessed.
4.2 Driver alertness Medical and psychological assessments are also seen as important in the selection of drivers, in monitoring performance, and after incidents and accidents.
4.3 Drugs and alcohol
4.4 Training Increasing privatisation makes it necessary to have a system of recognised transferable competencies, backed by law. Increasing cross-border operation means that train crew need an increasing knowledge of more than their own national systems. There is a need for harmonisation in operating systems, but this can be achieved only in the long term.
4.5 Communication The issue of communication has surfaced again with the increasing use of mobile phones within the industry. In Sweden mobile phones are used extensively, and all communication is recorded. In Italy mobile phones are used, but only when a train is stationary. In Germany, the UK and Ireland, mobile phones are not used for operational communications, but all these countries have secure radio systems, in which safety messages are received only by the person to whom they are sent. A further issue to be considered is the language to be used for international trains. Train drivers of different nationalities will in future have to communicate with different national control centres. A VTT (Finnish) study concluded that better technical quality of radio equipment and improved clarity of the contents of communications were important accident prevention measures.
4.6 Train boarding and alighting Different countries have different traditions about platform heights. Some have heights that enable passengers to board trains on the level; others have low platforms from which passengers have to climb into trains. Increasing inter-state travel may require more harmonisation in this area.
4.7 Dangerous goods Communication and information management are key aspects of the safe carriage of dangerous goods, especially in relation to the contents of vehicles and containers. A VTI (Swedish) study found that loading and unloading of dangerous goods is generally more dangerous than the actual movement. Dangerous working conditions often exist, such as dirty or slippery conditions for staff who have to climb on and off tank vehicles. Poor repair of railway tracks in yards can also cause problems. Staff training, especially in dealing with emergencies, and personal protective equipment are important.
4.8 People working on or about the track The key to reducing such accidents is careful planning and management of these activities. Wherever possible the requirement for staff to be on the track should be eliminated: examples are the increasing use of automatic couplers, which reduces the need for shunters on the track, and the use of radio communications, which reduces the need both for drivers to use lineside telephones and for staff to maintain them. Track maintenance work should be separated from the running of trains, and increasingly sophisticated planning allows this with minimum disruption to services. Where staff do have to be on the track when the railway is operating, good safety systems are needed: proper lookouts, warning procedures, and personal protective equipment. Railway maintenance is increasingly being carried out by contractors, rather than by railway staff. This places additional responsibilities on the client for ensuring the contractors are familiar with all the railway safety requirements.
4.9 Level Crossings Most countries have statutory or non-statutory rules for the application and operation of level crossings. Such rules cover the type of crossing that is to be used for specified road and rail traffic levels, the maximum permitted train speeds for the different types of crossing, the protective equipment required, video surveillance, road layouts and gradients, and the warning sequences for road users. However, each country's rules have developed separately, and are different from each other. It is possible that a number of lessons could be learned by the interchange of information. The long-term trend has been away from railway-controlled crossing towards automatic operation: these put the responsibility for safety primarily on the road user. They are not safer than railway-controlled crossings, but they reduce delays and costs. The best solution to level crossings is to replace them with bridges or underpasses. Several countries, including Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands have rolling long-term programmes for this. The priorities for these programmes are railway lines with relatively high speeds, lines where increases in speeds are planned, lines in urban areas, lines on which dangerous goods are carried, and locations with poor visibility. New high-speed lines are always built without level crossings. However, level crossings are so numerous, with many on lightly-used roads and railways, that there is no prospect of eliminating them entirely.
5 Conclusions Europe cannot develop its policies for rail without actively including safety. However, the major current problem is the lack of comprehensive rail safety information at the European level on which to base safety policy. Member states generally take rail safety seriously: they investigate accidents and record data domestically, but there is no effective mechanism by which the results and findings reach the European level: indeed, there is no central knowledge of what member states actually do. ETSC sees this as the major priority area. A number of recommendations for actions by the EU have been made in this briefing. For the short to medium term, however, ETSC sees the following as being of key importance:
Key changes are now taking place throughout Europe in the organisation of railways. The separation of infrastructure management from rail operation, and the entry of newcomers to the railway scene potentially increase railway risks. However, these risks can be controlled with suitable safety management. ETSC recommends that the EU:
Section 4 above identifies a number of other priority rail safety issues that are common to many member states. There is scope for countries to learn from each other, and ETSC recommends this.
6 Acknowledgement |